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Britain, Sanctions, and the Oligarchs: An Analysis of Crisis Communication and Image Restoration in the Ukraine Conflict

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Abstract

Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered a series of economic sanctions from the UK targeting the Russian government and influential oligarchs with significant assets abroad, particularly in the UK. As a global financial center, London faced a major challenge in balancing sanctions enforcement with maintaining domestic economic stability. This situation created a complex communications crisis. Employing Situational Crisis Communication Theory and a Strategic Narrative framework, this study examines the dual-sided communication crisis faced by both the UK Government and the sanctioned Russian billionaires. The research method used is qualitative with a literature study design. Secondary data was collected from legal products, research articles, and journals via Google Scholar and Portal Garuda. The findings reveal that the UK Government deployed a "moral justification" strategic narrative to counteract domestic pushback regarding economic inflation, while Russian oligarchs primarily utilized SCCT postures of "denial" (attacking the accuser) and "diminishment/rebuilding" (asset decoupling and strategic concessions) to protect their reputations. The study concludes that managing high-stakes geopolitical crises requires a synchronized alignment between policy enforcement and stakeholder-oriented communication.

Keywords: **Crisis communication, Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), Strategic narrative, UK Sanctions, Russian Oligarchs, Ukraine military operation.**

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 24, 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a significant turning point in international relations, triggering a multifaceted global crisis. The United Kingdom, as a pivotal player in the Western bloc, played a crucial role in imposing stringent economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy and influential individuals, notably the Russian oligarchs [1] [2].

These billionaires, who have historically maintained close ties to the Kremlin, have invested heavily in the UK, utilizing London's status as a global financial hub to manage their assets [3]. The sanctions imposed by the UK have resulted in unprecedented challenges for these oligarchs, including asset freezes, transaction bans, and travel restrictions, all aimed at exerting economic and political pressure on the Russian government to cease its aggression against Ukraine [4].

However, the sanctions have also introduced complex challenges for the UK itself. As a major financial center, the UK economy is deeply intertwined with global markets, and the restrictions on Russian oligarchs have reverberated through various sectors, including finance and real estate. The withdrawal of Russian investments has raised concerns about potential financial losses for banks and law firms that have historically catered to these oligarchs [5].

Furthermore, the UK government faces the dual challenge of managing public perception and maintaining international solidarity while navigating the economic implications of these sanctions. The communication crisis stemming from the sanctions is multifaceted. The UK government must effectively communicate the rationale behind these measures, emphasizing that they are not merely punitive but part of a broader strategy to restore international stability and deter further aggression from Russia.

This requires careful management of messages directed at various stakeholders, including the domestic public, international allies, and the business community. Transparency and consistency in communication are essential to foster understanding and support for the sanctions. Simultaneously, the sanctioned oligarchs are engaged in their own communication strategies, attempting to mitigate the impact of the sanctions through public relations campaigns and legal challenges. They often employ reputable PR firms to maintain their image and influence within Western markets, seeking to navigate the complexities of their new reality [6].

This dynamic creates a challenging environment for the UK government, which must balance the enforcement of sanctions with the need to manage relationships with influential figures who have long been part of the London business community [7].

While existing literature extensively covers the macroeconomic and legal mechanisms of Western sanctions, there is a notable research gap regarding the discursive and crisis-communication dimensions of this geopolitical fallout. Previous studies have rarely viewed sanctions as a two-way communicative battlefield where state actors and non-state economic elites compete for narrative hegemony. To bridge this gap, this paper analyzes the phenomenon through two foundational communication frameworks: Coombs' (2007) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) which categorizes how actors protect their reputations based on crisis responsibility, and the Strategic Narrative framework, which articulates how state actors project meaning to achieve political goals.

II. METHODOLOGY

The author collects data and information through qualitative research to identify patterns in the symptoms described. According to Creswell J [8], qualitative research is artistic and descriptive, emphasizing a deeper understanding of the observed phenomena and their overall meaning. Studying social processes inductively from the perspective of individuals and groups is greatly facilitated by qualitative research.

This study uses literature review design. According to Dena Taylor [9], a literature review is a collection of academic publications that have been published on a specific topic. To ensure methodological transparency, secondary data collection followed a strict inclusion and exclusion protocol. Articles were retrieved from Google Scholar and Portal Garuda using specific keyword strings: ("Crisis Communication" AND "Russian Oligarchs") and ("UK Sanctions" AND "Strategic Narrative"). The selection was restricted to: (1) peer-reviewed academic journals and verified policy texts published between 2019 and 2024; (2) contents explicitly examining the communication, PR, or diplomatic framing of the UK-Russia sanctions.

The traditional review technique was applied to evaluate gaps in the current literature [10]. The collected data was processed through five sequential stages of qualitative synthesis [11]: *compare* (finding similarities across texts), *contrast* (identifying discrepancies in stakeholder messaging), *criticize* (evaluating the validity of public statements against actual policy outputs), *synthesize* (integrating the empirical data with SCCT and Strategic Narrative concepts), and *summarize* (drawing final analytical conclusions)

III. RESULT

Through the systematic application of the five-stage qualitative synthesis, the empirical findings of the literature review were categorized into two primary communicative vectors representing the conflicting actors:

A. The UK Government's Narrative Trajectory

The synthesized literature indicates that the UK Government's communication underwent a structural shift across two distinct phases: The Offensive Phase (Moral Framing): At the onset of the invasion, state rhetoric heavily relied on a "values-based strategic narrative," framing the rapid freezing of £1.5 billion in oligarch assets as an uncompromising moral duty to delegitimize the Kremlin.

The Defensive Phase (Stakeholder Containment): As domestic inflation rose, the government was forced into a "diminishment posture," shifting its communication toward explaining complex legal compliance to anxious domestic businesses and reassuring the British public that short-term economic pain was a necessary cost for long-term European security.

B. The Oligarchs' Crisis Posture Categorization

Far from remaining passive, sanctioned Russian billionaires utilized the UK media landscape to project specific crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2007), which synthesized into two major typologies: The Denial & Attack Posture: Utilized primarily by industrial magnates (e.g., Alisher Usmanov), characterized by issuing public rejections of Kremlin complicity and framing Western sanctions as unlawful "financial persecution."

The Rebuilding & Transcendence Posture: Utilized by high-profile public-facing oligarchs (e.g., Roman Abramovich), characterized by strategic concessions, such as divesting high-value cultural assets (Chelsea FC) and framing the proceeds as humanitarian aid to capture public sympathy.

DISCUSSION

A. The UK Government's Strategic Narrative

The ongoing communication crisis surrounding the sanctions imposed by the UK is deeply rooted in the historical context of post-Cold War geopolitical tensions. The situation escalated notably in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, an act that was widely condemned and viewed as a violation of international law. This annexation was part of a broader strategy by President Vladimir Putin to reassert Russian influence over Ukraine, which included supporting separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine [12]. The recent invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 can be seen as a continuation of this strategy, aiming to restore Ukraine as a Russian ally by destabilizing its government and fostering pro-Russian sentiments within its borders [13].

Following the 2022 invasion, the UK's implementation of comprehensive sanctions led to an immediate domestic communication dilemma [15]. Sanctions typically involve multifaceted measures—asset freezes, travel bans, and severing banking ties—which are exceptionally difficult for the average citizen to understand.

This complexity created an initial vacuum of public trust. The media's portrayal of London as "Londongrad"—a historical haven for illicit Russian wealth—intensified public scrutiny over perceived government delays in sanctioning prominent figures [17]. To counter this, the government had to pivot its strategic narrative. Rather than issuing dry legal justifications, state communicators engaged in value-bolstering communication, emphasizing that targeting oligarchs was a direct disruption of Putin’s war machine.

Moreover, the economic repercussions of the sanctions have created additional communication challenges. While the sanctions aim to weaken the Russian economy, they also have significant implications for the UK economy, including rising energy prices and inflation. These side effects have heightened public anxiety amid a growing cost-of-living crisis, making it crucial for the government to communicate the long-term benefits of sanctions for global security while addressing immediate domestic economic concerns [18]. Without effective communication, public support for the sanction’s risks diminishing as citizens grapple with personal financial pressures. The media's role in this communication crisis cannot be understated. Investigative reporting has highlighted the extensive presence of Russian wealth in the UK, prompting questions about the government's past and present policies regarding oligarchs. This scrutiny has placed additional pressure on the government to act decisively and transparently, reinforcing the need for clear communication about the enforcement of sanctions and the rationale behind them [19].

Failure to manage this narrative effectively could damage the UK's credibility as it seeks to present a united front against Russian aggression. Because UK sanctions form part of a broader effort coordinated with allies such as the European Union and the United States, inconsistencies in their timing and scope complicate communication: while the UK quickly froze the assets of Russian oligarchs, some EU states hesitated, fostering perceptions of disunity among Western allies. The UK must therefore assert its leadership while managing the narrative surrounding the global response to Russia's invasion [20].

Diplomatic communication is equally critical. Sustaining a unified response requires close coordination with allies, since differences in military aid and sanctions approaches can strain these relationships; the UK's military assistance to Ukraine must be handled sensitively to align with international efforts without causing misunderstandings. The sanctions also carry economic complexity: as multinational firms sever their ties with Russia, the government must explain the rationale for the measures, provide clear compliance guidance, and address the concerns of affected British businesses to preserve confidence. Finally, the resulting humanitarian crisis and influx of Ukrainian refugees demand urgent communication; with misinformation obscuring the reality on the ground, the government must articulate its refugee policies and supply accurate, timely information so that support reaches those in need [21].

Here's a diagram summarizing the communication crisis in the Russian military operations as described in the article below.

Figure 1. Communication Crisis Diagram



In summary, there are many facets to the communication dilemma surrounding the UK's sanctions on Russia, including the intricacy of measures like travel restrictions, asset freezes, and cutting off commercial links with Russian companies. Delays in penalizing well-known oligarchs have left the public perplexed and frustrated, and media attention has heightened criticism of the government's policies. The economic effects, such as inflation and rising energy costs, have increased public fear, making it necessary to communicate clearly the long-term advantages of sanctions for international security. Investigative reporting by the media has put pressure on the government to take transparent action. Despite variations in the timing and extent of sanctions, international cooperation with allies such as the US and the EU is essential. To sustain public support and guarantee a coordinated international response, good communication is crucial. The humanitarian crisis involving Ukrainian refugees and the impact on businesses, which necessitates compliance guidance, further complicate the communication scene.

B. The relationship has deteriorated

The deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations has been marked by a series of significant incidents, culminating in the 2018 poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England. Following this incident, then-Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson publicly accused the Russian government of orchestrating the attack, asserting that President Vladimir Putin had given the order. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence linking the Kremlin to the attack, Johnson's statements reflected a broader sentiment of suspicion towards Russian actions, leading to a significant diplomatic fallout [22]. In response to the Skripal poisoning, the UK government, under Prime Minister Theresa May, expelled 23 Russian diplomats from London, a move that was echoed by 22 other countries, resulting in the expulsion of a total of 150 Russian diplomats worldwide. This collective action was framed as a necessary measure to protect national security and prevent further assassination attempts [23]. The United States also participated in this diplomatic expulsion, removing 48 embassy staff and 12 members of Russia's permanent mission to the United Nations, further illustrating the international consensus against Russia's alleged actions [24].

Despite these measures, British chemical weapons experts were unable to definitively prove that the nerve agent used in the attack was manufactured in the Soviet Union during the 1970s. Nevertheless, the UK continued to maintain its stance that Russia was responsible for the assassination attempt, leading to a propaganda campaign aimed at shaping global public opinion against Russia. Russia, for its part, has repeatedly demanded evidence of its involvement, which the UK has consistently refused to provide, further straining diplomatic relations. In retaliation for the UK's actions, Russia expelled 23 British diplomats and 60 US diplomats and closed the British cultural office and consulate in St. Petersburg. This reciprocal action demonstrated Russia's unwillingness to submit to Western pressure and its determination to respond to perceived aggressions. The ongoing tensions have been exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which prompted the UK to impose further sanctions and engage in an anti-Russian campaign aimed at isolating Russia internationally [25]. The UK government has also initiated plans to combat Russian disinformation campaigns, recognizing the need for a coordinated response to the challenges posed by Russia's actions in Ukraine. This reflects a broader strategy to address the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape and the need for effective communication in the face of ongoing conflict [26]. From the Skripal poisoning to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the decline of Anglo-Russian ties has ultimately been marked by a string of increasingly serious crises. When considering national security, propaganda, and economic sanctions, the diplomatic reactions from both sides highlight the complexity of international relations.

C. RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN INVESTMENT

London has long been recognized as a prime destination for wealthy individuals and tycoons from various countries, including Russia and Ukraine, seeking to invest in property and other ventures. The city's status as a leading financial hub in Europe has made it an attractive market for investments in both technology and real estate. The implementation of the "Golden Visa" scheme by the UK has further facilitated this trend, allowing affluent individuals, including many Russian tycoons, to obtain residency by investing a minimum of £2 million in the

UK. Since the scheme's inception in 2008, at least 2,581 investor visas have been issued to Russian citizens, underscoring the significant influx of Russian capital into the UK property market [27].

However, this scheme was suspended on February 17, 2022, amid growing scrutiny of the UK's relationship with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. The suspension reflects a broader shift in the UK government's approach to Russian investments, particularly as concerns about the influence of wealthy Russian individuals on British politics and society have intensified [28]. Russian investments in the UK have predominantly focused on real estate, with Transparency International estimating that Russian tycoons own approximately £1.5 billion worth of property in Britain. This includes significant holdings in energy companies and football clubs, such as Newcastle United and Arsenal, as well as Chelsea FC, which was recently sold by Roman Abramovich due to the sanctions imposed on him. On the other hand, Ukrainian investments in the UK have also increased, particularly since Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Prominent Ukrainian businessman Rinat Akhmetov has made substantial investments in some of London's most prestigious areas. The influx of Ukrainian elites and socialites seeking to safeguard their assets in the UK has further solidified London’s reputation as a haven for foreign investments. The ongoing conflict has prompted many wealthy

Ukrainians to relocate their investments to the UK, contributing to a notable rise in Ukrainian capital in the British market. This radar chart below representing the Russian and Ukrainian investments in the UK.

Figure. 2 Russian and Ukrainian investments

This visual representation highlights the significant presence of Russian capital in the UK property market and the notable increase in Ukrainian investments, particularly in prestigious areas of London. However, the recent geopolitical tensions have led to increased scrutiny and regulatory changes that may alter the future of these investments.

D. SUPPORT IS NOT OPTIMAL

The UK's response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has involved significant financial and military assistance, yet it has faced criticism for its handling of refugee support. The British government has committed approximately £1.44 trillion in financial aid through the World Bank to help Ukraine maintain essential functions and alleviate financial pressures resulting from the Russian invasion. This assistance is part of a broader strategy that includes providing military equipment, such as over 4,000 anti-tank weapons, Starstreak high-speed anti-aircraft missiles, and personal protective gear [29].

However, the UK government's approach to refugee support has been criticized as inadequate. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Home Secretary Priti Patel have faced backlash for rejecting calls to simplify visa processes for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the conflict. Patel's decision to freeze visa applications and close the visa application office in Kyiv has drawn significant criticism, especially as the United Nations estimates that over 1.5 million people have fled Ukraine since the onset of hostilities. Many have sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, where the response has been more welcoming compared to the UK [30]. The criticism has been amplified by reports of refugees being stranded in France, unable to enter the UK despite having secured visas. This situation has led to diplomatic tensions and highlighted the perceived lack of openness in the UK's response to what has been described as the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. Charities and opposition lawmakers have voiced their concerns, arguing that the UK should be more proactive in addressing the needs of Ukrainian refugees [31].

While the UK has provided substantial financial and military support to Ukraine, its handling of refugee assistance has not met the expectations of many observers. The government's restrictive visa policies and the challenges faced by refugees seeking to enter the UK have raised questions about the adequacy of its humanitarian response amid a significant crisis.

IV. CONCLUSION

This study set out to reframe the United Kingdom's response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine not as a purely legal or economic event, but as a two-sided communicative battlefield on which state and non-state actors competed for narrative hegemony. Reading the episode through Coombs' Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and the Strategic Narrative framework, the analysis identified two distinct yet interlocking communicative vectors.

On the state side, the UK Government's messaging moved through two phases. In its offensive phase, it deployed a values-based strategic narrative, framing the rapid freezing of approximately £1.5 billion in oligarch assets as a moral duty that delegitimized the Kremlin and disrupted Putin's "war machine." As the domestic cost-of-living crisis deepened, however, the government was forced into a defensive, diminishment-oriented phase, recasting short-term economic pain as a necessary price for long-term European security and pivoting toward stakeholder containment aimed at anxious businesses and a sceptical public.

On the non-state side, sanctioned oligarchs were far from passive. Their responses crystallized into two postures: a denial-and-attack posture (exemplified by Alisher Usmanov), which rejected Kremlin complicity and recast sanctions as unlawful "financial persecution"; and a rebuilding-and-transcendence posture (exemplified by Roman Abramovich), which used strategic concessions—most visibly the divestment of Chelsea FC and the reframing of its proceeds as humanitarian aid—to court public sympathy.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the credibility of a sanctions regime rests not only on the severity of its measures but on the synchronization between policy enforcement and stakeholder-oriented communication. Where messaging is inconsistent, whether across allied governments that differ in the timing and scope of sanctions, or between a state's stated moral aims and its domestic economic realities—narrative authority erodes and rival actors gain room to reframe the crisis in their favour. The study's principal contribution is therefore to position crisis communication as a central, rather than peripheral, instrument of geopolitical statecraft: in high-stakes conflicts, the contest over meaning is itself a theatre of the conflict.

Finally, as a literature-based synthesis, this study is limited by its reliance on secondary data. Future research could test the dual-vector pattern identified here against primary discourse data—official press releases, parliamentary debates, and oligarchs' direct media statements—and extend the analysis comparatively to other sanctioning states and sanctioned elites.

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